The only real reason to go for these is for speed and convenience, not security. The speed boost would be from the dedicated hardware handling the encryption.
However, if the key (or even a partial key or hash) is stored on NVRAM, it can be got. my guess is that part of it is stored, and the other part is generated when powered up, and stored somewhere volatile. That can be gotten as well; I've seen it done on something running TrueCrypt, where they sprayed the RAM with canned air upside down to freeze the chip.
There have always been those BIOS-level drive passwords that 'platter lock' the disk. Whenever I had a drive go bad, I could still get something for it on ebay, because people were buying the circuit board. They had locked up their drive, and by replacing the circuit board, they could get back into it.
I have always wanted an auto-wipe feature, and looked at incorporating DBANto run in the background while a decoy OS booted up, but it takes a long ass time to really wipe a disk, and it makes a lot of noise.
If the drive is already encrypted, you can render it (feasibly) unrecoverable by writing random data to random sectors. It takes nowhere near as long to do this; you just have to destroy enough to defeat error checking capabilities in the decryption process. The flaw is that this requires the disk to stay with the rest of the machine, unless you want to fuck around with the onboard circuitry.